northkorea

DPRK state media reported that Cabinet Premier Choe Yong Rim visited the Pyongyang Vegetable Research Institute, the Pyongyang Floriculture Institute and the construction of the Pyongyang Folk Park on 20 May (Sunday).  KCNA reports:

Premier Choe Yong Rim, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the C.C. , the Workers’ Party of Korea, acquainted himself with the progress made in the projects for expanding the capacities of the water culture hot houses of the Pyongyang Vegetable Science Institute and the green houses of the Pyongyang Floricultural Institute Sunday on the spot.

The projects started on the initiative of leader Kim Jong Il who devoted himself to providing the people with a more bountiful life and highly civilized living conditions till the last moments of his life and under the deep care of the dear respected Kim Jong Un.

They are now making dynamic progress at their final phase thanks to the high revolutionary zeal of the builders.

After learning about the progress made in the above-said projects, Choe went round the water culture hothouses associated with the dynamic leadership provided by Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un to acquaint himself in detail with the production and supply of vegetables.

Underscoring the need to complete as early as possible the building of hothouses as required by the method of construction so that they may positively contribute to improving the people’s living standard, he took steps for settling the issues arising in the projects.

On the same day he visited the Pyongyang Folk Park where projects are progressing at their final phase and stressed the need to strictly observe the principle of historicism in the construction.

Filed under: Central Committee, central party life, choe yong rim, DPRK Cabinet, DPRK Premier, Korean Workers' Party (KWP), land and enviroment, North Korean press, Party elders, Political Bureau, State Planning Commission (SPC)

...-index. Azerbajdzjan ligger i dag på plats 140 av 167, mittemellan Vitryssland och Kina. I botten ligger Nordkorea och i topp Norge. Sverige ligger på fjärde plats.Reportrar utan gränser sammanställer ett index över pressfrihet. Azerbajdzjan ligger plats 162 av 179.Så sent som 2010 antogs en lag som förbjuder våld i...

We are once again getting leaks about a pending UN Panel of Experts Report. If the earlier reports are any indication, the document will provide useful detail on North Korea’s efforts to circumvent the sanctions regime. But it will also set in train a highly politicized debate among the Five Parties, including particularly the Chinese. [...]

Early last week, the Rason City Administration announced that their inaugural Rason International Trade Exhibition of 2011 was going to have a second incarnation this summer. The invitation has been helpfully uploaded on NKeconwatch. As with the video presentations last year, materials for the trade fair seem to be primarily in English, with Chinese as a distant second. This is indicative of a long term goal to have this trade fair (and Rason more generally) develop as something greater than just a two nation affair. Interestingly, The Rason Exhibition Corporation, founded specifically to organize the trade fair, only has advertised offices in two foreign countries: China and in Singapore.

Meanwhile, Kim Yong Nam was on a trip to Indonesia, via Singapore. Kim had with him Ri Kwang Gun, chairman of the Joint Venture and Investment Commission and An Jong Su, minister of Light Industry. The Singapore portion was brief, but the Indonesia portion was largely focused on economic issues.

From the Jakarta Post, largely quoting Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa:

“There was indeed sharpened focus on economy and trade during the meeting. Not only about investment itself, but there was also interest [on the part of] North Korea that Indonesia could share how to regulate or manage foreign investment in the country. We noted that North Korea’s attention was quite high on the topics related to economic development and investment,” Marty announced at the State Palace after the meeting.

“Talks on this issue were also raised during the meetings of North Korea’s ministerial-level officials with the Indonesian government before President Kim’s visit today,” the minister added.

There were, however, no concrete business agreements made.

Minister Marty described the discussions on investment as at the “exploration level”. North Korea is no doubt keen to reestablish what was once a close relationship with Indonesia in the hope of striking large investment deals down the road. Indonesia, by the way, is sometimes lauded as an example of a “Reformist Autocracy” that has managed to avoid a resource curse.

Friday saw the Rodong Sinmun carry a story called “DPRK Official Outlines Investment Environment“. Kim Il Sun, who is a section head of the JVIC gave a speech at the Koryo Hotel. Among other things, he said that to “keep apace with the developing world economy which is characterized by cooperation and exchange, the DPRK government has been paying due attention to the expansion of external economic cooperation based on the constant development of the foundations of the self-reliant socialist economy and making active efforts to create favorable environment for investment.”

JVIC is the main organ though which FDI is regulated and managed. It is also involved in overseeing the Rason SEZ.

Kim also touted underground resources, saying “rich natural resources serve as a strong foundation that guarantees the development of the self-reliant economy.”

We will be most interested to see if the Rason trade fair expands, if Indonesia and the DPRK strike and large deals in the coming months and if expanded trade and self-reliance are compatible. One thing is clear: JVIC seems increasingly in the news, taking a more visible role for both North Koreans and foreigners.

Porous Net: 28 Questions on the “Chinese Fisherman Held Hostage by North Korea” Narrative

by Adam Cathcart

It remains a bit early to draw sweeping conclusions about what this all means, the data points are adding up to a not-so-pretty picture and the fallout to China’s relationship with North Korea seems likely to be rather intense.

With reference to the Chinese sources available, more and more are coming out, but this represents a decent cross-section of what has been written so far. Given the fluidity of how this is all unfolding, I will continue to update this entry until all 28 questions — one for each fisherman — are posed and “answered.”  Readers are invited to tender their own responses, questions, and links in the comments section and I will do my best to get those moderated as quickly as possible.

1. What happened in the first place? 

 Evan Ramstad at Wall Street Journal’s summary is as good as any:

The circumstances of the detention are unclear. According to Chinese media, three fishing vessels operating in Chinese waters in the northern reaches of the Yellow Sea were forcibly boarded on May 8. All three vessels and their crews were then taken to North Korea.

The North Koreans who seized the Chinese fishing crews had guns, but it wasn’t clear whether they were police. Several Chinese media reports say the Chinese fishing boats were operating in Chinese waters.

The following day, one of the Chinese detainees made a call via satellite phone back to a fishing company in Donggang [Liaoning province, near Dandong], where all the vessels were based, and said the North Koreans were seeking payments of 400,000 yuan, or about $63,000, per vessel to secure the release of the 29, state-run China Central Television reported Wednesday.

Yesterday, after some as-yet-unclear negotiating jujitsu, all three of the boats along with 28 of the reported 29 fishermen returned to China’s Liaodong Peninsula early this morning, May 21.

2. Did the North Koreans Kill Anybody? 

Huanqiu Shibao conspicuously reports that while 29 fisherman had been reported detained, only 28 arrived back in Dalian after the release. The list of names, places of origin, and ID numbers of individual detained fisherman has been available for several days now; it appears that state media is not going to release the names of the 28 released (which would allow netizens to immediately find the missing name) or explain why the discrepancy exists. This is slightly strange.  Since the information as to the number of returnees is from Hao Zhou [郝洲], a Xinhua reporter on the scene at the hospital where the fishermen are being checked, it trumps reports like this one from BBC that states that all 29 came back.

3. What Condition Were the Vessels and Crew In Upon their Return to Dalian?

Not good. Chinese state media disclosed that “三艘中国渔船的物资被全部抢光，船上一片狼藉，多数船员在关押时衣服也被扒得只剩内衣，船员的情绪十分低落 [The three boats were completely stripped of supplies, the deck in ruins, and all of the fisherman had been stripped of their clothes with the exception of their underwear.  The morale of the crew is completely low.]” One can assume that state media has is treating this gingerly; there has been no triumphal return with PLA naval escort, in any event. Xinhua photographer 刘德斌 (Liu Debing) was on the scene and has some photos at the link above. The boats are moored in the Dali military harbor [大连大李军港码头] in Dalian.

4. What did we learn from the returned sailors?

From the print media, we can find a short and fairly explosive interview with the captain of one of the vessels:

辽丹渔23979号船长朱闯向环球网记者表示，当时被朝方扣押时，我渔船正在中国渔业区作业。朝鲜士兵强行登船后，将我渔民全部关押在船上一个装垃圾的小仓中。Zhu Chuang, the captain of Liaodan Fishing Vessel #23979, told a Huanqiu Net reporter that “At the time that the North Koreans captured us, our ship was working directly in China’s fishing zone [正在中国渔业区作业].  After the North Korean soldiers forcibly boarded the vessel, they put held all of we fisherman into the ship’s garbage compartment.”

Presumably, more of this kind of material is going to be coming out and it won’t be very nice.

5. Who were the pirates? 

One of the only sources of information for this whole case prior to today was the boat captain back in Dalian, surnamed Zhang, who said that the kidnappers who called him spoke Chinese.  Perhaps in combination with the fact that the list of held Chinese contained many who hailed from Heilongjiang and northeast China is famous for acts of transnational banditry, speculation began to pool around the notion that the whole thing was concocted by Heilongjiang gangs in collusion with law-breaking North Korean soldiers.  This meme has been now been conclusively struck down by the interview with Captain Zhu, who appears to be the source for the reporting that when the North Koreans got on the boat, there were some who spoke Chinese, but that they weren’t Chinese. “From the beginning to the end,” wrote the reporters, the North Koreans spoke not one word to them, and gave them food down in the garbage hold, where they were deprived of sunlight for 13 days.  Finally, at the very end, a North Korean opened the door and told them in simple Chinese, “You go (你走).”

Still no speculation allowed in official Chinese mediaabout KPA (Korean Peoples’ Army) involvement, but there ought to be feast of such on Weibo, and the Daily NK report on Friday seems one step closer to confirmation.

6.What did the Chinese Embassy say about the case?

Nothing, until they put this out (and, in my book, back-dated it May 18; I made a check of the Embassy’s website on May 19 and certainly do not recall seeing this):

连日来，刘洪才大使及中国驻朝鲜使馆外交、领 事官员一直就朝鲜近期抓扣中方渔船事与朝方进行交涉并保持沟通，要求朝方确保中国船员合法权益。据朝方通报称，目前中国船员安全无恙，饮食、健康均有保 障，部分被扣船只和船员已返航。中国驻朝鲜使馆将继续努力，确保问题尽快得到妥善解决。In the past few days, Ambassador Liu Hongcai, along with diplomats and consular officers in the Chinese Embassy in the DPRK, have continuously initiated negotiations and maintained close communication with the North Korean side [与朝方进行交涉并保持沟通] with regard to the recent snatching [抓扣] of Chinese fishing boats, requesting that the North Korean side to ensure the legitimate rights and interests of the Chinese crew. According to reports by the North Korean side, the current condition of the crew is that they are completely unharmed, and that their diet and health are guaranteed, and that both the crew and vessel could be returned [This is a bit unclear; indicative that the ships themselves might have been a negotiating point, a la USS Pueblo?]. The Chinese Embassy in the DPRK will continue to work hard to ensure that problems are properly resolved as soon as possible.

7. What else was the Chinese ambassador doing this whole time?

When the case was finally discussed in public on Thursday by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, MOFA spokesman intimated that “diplomats” were working on the case, which clearly included Liu Hongcai, China’s ambassador to North Korea.

The Embassy’s public itinerary has been quite light since the death of Kim Jong Il, and this month was no exception.  On May 8, the day of the abductions at sea, something actually happened: a group of Chinese students arrived in Pyongyang. The Ambassador, who would normally meet as the epicenter in the small world of overseas Chinese in Pyongyang, was not there.  On May 15, the Ambassador emerged to give a speech and have some dinner at a commercial gathering in Pyongyang, ironically enough, drumming up business for visiting trade delegations from Liaoning and Jilin, which is where most of the hostages hailed from.

One of the major “events” in North Korean foreign policy prior to the incident blowing up was a renewed embrace of Indonesia, and Liu Hongcai played a role here as well, both sending off and then meeting again the octogenarian DPRK Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam at the Pyongyang airport at either end of his trip in mid-May.

The interesting thing here is that Liu Hongcai’s involvement in the Indonesia hand-off was not reported in the Chinese media, but mentioned twice in North Korean media, both the original Rodong Sinmun release about Kim’s departure, and then in English KCNA when the Foreign Minister came back.  (These are the kind of marginal data points which I try to track and tweet; roughly 85% of the material surveyed and described is complete dreck, but occasionally these kind of details are useful to keep track of.)  This discrepancy in coverage is interesting because DPRK state media tends to mention Liu Hongcai when they want something and ignore him when they don’t.

21 more questions and preliminary answers to come…

 

http://t.co/Khrw9o3r SKorea presses NKorea to refrain from provocations: South Korea's top nuclear negotiator sa... http://t.co/KJCT9kkj The top U.S. envoy for North Korea is warning Pyongyang that any nuclear test will be met with "swift and sure" international punishment. Link - Trackbacks

In der vergangenen Woche schlug vor allem in den südkoreanischen Medien eine Geschichte immer wieder Wellen, die aus irgendeinem Grund nicht wirklich in den Deutschland angekommen ist, obwohl ich sie durchaus für bezeichnend für die Umstände im nordkoreanisch-chinesischen Grenzgebiet halte. Dabei geht es um vier südkoreanische Aktivisten, die sich für nordkoreanische Flüchtlinge einsetzen. Diese wurden [...]

One of South Korea's American insiders writes a book about the country's future.

“Pyongyang paints history in its own image” Andrei Lankov Asia Times 2012-5-11

“Book Review: Secret History of the KLO in the Korean War” Stephen Mercado Intelligence in Public Literature

“South Korea-North Korea Relations: Plumbing the Depths” Aidan Foster-Carter Comparative Connections 

“NKIDP e-Dossier No. 6: The Origins of the Northern Limit Line Dispute Terence Roehrig” Wilson Center North Korea International Documentation Project

“NKIDP e-Dossier No. 7: East German Documents on Kim Il Sung’s April 1975 Trip to Beijing” Ria Chae Wilson Center North Korea International Documentation Project 

According to the Daily NK:

The popularity of South Korean culture is so high in North Korea that dramas aired on one day in the South are being made into DVDs in northeastern China the next and, by the third day, are cropping up on the fringes of North Korean markets. The North Korean people are then watching these dramas over and over again, sharing them with close friends and swapping them for others with trusted confidantes. In the process, the fashions worn by the stars of these dramas become objects of considerable envy.

It is thus inevitable that South Korean clothes would be popular among the North Korean people more generally. As a Yangkang Province source told the Daily NK recently, “Even households that are not doing that well are going out in South Korean clothes, while the demand for Chinese goods is more limited.”

In particular, the source went on, “Since the start of this year, there have been noticeably more people selling South Korean clothes in the markets, because that is what people want to buy.” Prices reflect this, the source said; for example, South Korean t-shirts sell for nearly double the price of the Chinese equivalent.

Despite the fact that selling South Korean products is deemed treasonous by the North Korean authorities, the practice continues. People refer to the illicit clothes in creative ways to avoid official censure; for instance, ‘Clothes with no label’ or ‘Clothes from the house below’. And indeed the clothes do not have labels, because they are removed in order to get through customs on the Sino-North Korean border.

According to the source, “People believe that Chinese clothes are not good enough, to the extent that they need some additional needlework before they can even be worn. South Korean clothes are the opposite; good design and good quality. Even without the label, people know whether they are seeing a South Korean or Chinese item.”

This phenomenal demand for South Korean clothes first started when North Korean defectors began to send South Korean clothes through smugglers to family. One such defector recently received orders from her family back in North Korea, namely “send as many South Korean clothes as you can because I can sell them all in the market.”

“She used to tell me not to send anything that might get her in trouble,” the source recalled. “Nothing tight-fitting, bright colored, revealing or with English letters on. But that is not the case anymore.”

▲ South Korea seizing the ‘hanbok’ market

The preference for South Korean clothes not only refers to daily wear, it also extends to North Korea’s traditional ‘hanbok’. Cha Kwang Ok, a woman of 40 who recently defected said, “Last year I went to my cousin’s house in Pyongyang and saw people in the city wearing hanbok, but they looked different to the ones they usually wear in Chosun. I thought to myself at the time, ‘Pyongyang’s economy has really developed’; they were the South Korean style hanbok.”

North Korea’s traditional hanbok jacket has a narrow ‘dongjeong’ (thin white cloth-covered paper collar) and is of a single color. It features embroidered flowers, and there are only two different styles. In contrast, South Korean hanbok, as worn by queens in the many, many historical dramas produced by South Korean broadcasters, have a wider dongjeong and are of multiple colors.

Han Yong Kwon, age 46 and originally from Pyongyang, defected to South Korea in 2011. In her estimation, “Even as late as 2010 I could not see women wearing South Korean-style hanbok in Pyongyang, so seeing them appearing now in the so-called ‘Capital of the Revolution’ is evidence that the ‘Korean Wave’ is spreading rapidly in North Korea.”

Additional evidence for the same can even be found in the Chosun Art Film Studio-published 2012 calendar, wherein there is a picture of a model wearing the same hanbok as South Korean actress Lee Young Ae wore in the 2003 drama ‘The Great Jang Geum’, showing that even North Korean state entities no longer seem to regard the colorful hanbok as particularly South Korean.

Read the full story here: South Korea Seizing Clothing Market Daily NK Kang Mi Jin 2012-5-21

Delegations Galore: Signs of a Continuing Rift in Sino-NK Relations

by Brian Gleason,

Although China and North Korea have maintained strong bilateral ties for decades, North Korea’s relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons, advanced missile systems and “satellite launches” has continued to take its toll on the relationship. In the aftermath of North Korea’s failed rocket launch on April 13, China joined the other members of the UN Security Council in a unanimous condemnation of the launch – a marked divergence from China’s previous stance of “urging calm and restraint” in the wake of North Korea’s 2009 launch of the Unha-2 rocket.

Eight days after the botched 2012 launch, North Korea sent the secretary for international affairs of the North Korean Workers’ Party, Kim Yong-il, to Beijing for a high-level strategic dialogue with Wang Jiarui, the head of the Chinese Communist Party’s international department. Hu Jintao also met with the North Korean delegation, affirming the strong friendship and cooperation between China and North Korea but simultaneously emphasizing the need to make “unremitting efforts to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula” and to realize the “long-term security of Northeast Asia.” Hu Jintao’s platitudes nevertheless hinted at Beijing’s growing irritation with Pyongyang’s regional provocations, and in case Hu’s implicit nudge went unnoticed, a subsequent report in Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun surely grabbed Pyongyang’s attention.

Reading Between the Lines | The April 19 report in the Japanese daily, which cited diplomatic sources working for Chinese and North Korean authorities, claimed that China had suspended the repatriation of North Korean refugees in the wake of the North’s failed rocket launch.

The Chinese government has suspended deporting North Korean defectors in accordance with a request from the South Korean government, according to sources working for Chinese and North Korean authorities.

Diplomatic sources said the move indicated Beijing’s displeasure with Pyongyang for ignoring China’s demand to refrain from internationally problematic actions, such as last week’s long-range ballistic missile launch.

Some contend that the report is inaccurate,[1] and while it is highly unlikely that the Chinese government would announce a major policy shift through a Japanese newspaper, its possible that the report was an indirect message from Beijing to Pyongyang regarding China’s displeasure with the North’s international antagonism and lack of consideration for its Chinese ally. Since North Korea initially “kept China in the dark about the details of its missile launch plan” and then ignored China’s calls for restraint, the leadership in Beijing may have sent a subtle reminder to their friends in Pyongyang that the relationship is a two-way street.

Sensitive Border Issues | Adding to the tension, the April 23 murders in Hyesan sparked a manhunt that led North Korea’s 10^th Corps across the border into China, despite the PRC’s dwindling patience with the North in the wake of the rocket launch. After three days without any arrests, the DPRK dispatched a delegation from the Ministry of People’s Security (MPS), headed by General Ri Song Choi, to meet Chinese Vice Minister of Public Security Meng Hongwei. During the initial meeting on April 27, the Chinese border patrol announced that they had arrested the two men from Hyesan, and repatriated them the following day. The North Korean delegation returned home on May 1, but despite mutual commitments to continue cooperation in law enforcement and security, the incident underscored the highly sensitive nature of border issues during times of political friction.

The Hyesan incident reminded observers that China has numerous reasons to seek a secure border and prevent an influx of North Korean refugees (or rogue border guards) into China — it is virtually inconceivable that China would ever enact an open border policy. Thus, one can juxtapose the evident desire of Beijing to use possible changes in refugee policy as a lever against Pyongyang versus the very hard limited room for maneuver that actually exists, barring wholesale reevaluation of the refugee policy.  Thus it appears that the Yomiuri Shimbun method allows for more lateral, or indirect, confrontation with Pyongyang, allowing the leadership in Beijing to get the message across without either side “losing face” because the sources can always be denied.

China Seeks Use of Leverage over the DPRK | North Korea relies on China for diplomatic protection and support via China’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council and its chairmanship of the Six-Party Talks. In this regard, China usually accommodates the North, utilizing its position within the UNSC to protect North Korea on numerous occasions. For example, China reportedly blocked the publication of a February 2011 UN special report that accused North Korea of violating sanctions on its nuclear program, effectively shielding North Korea from the sanctions committee.[2] In general, China is often reluctant to support punishing North Korean provocations, opting instead for strategic dialogue.

In return for China’s multifaceted assistance to the North, China also expects to use its special relationship with the DPRK as leverage in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. By demonstrating its unique ability to influence, persuade or coerce North Korea, China endeavors to prove that it can play a leadership role in facilitating positive outcomes with the DPRK when other countries fail. For example, in March 2003, China reportedly cut off oil supplies to North Korea for three days during a nuclear dispute with the US, prompting Kim Jong-il to briefly slow down reprocessing in favor of dialogue; China was thereafter credited with jumpstarting the Six-Party Talks in August. Three years later, U.S. President George Bush specifically thanked China for brokering the diplomatic breakthrough that once again restarted the stalled Six-Party Talks.

Of course, China’s willingness to use its leverage with North Korea is not entirely motivated by goodwill — Beijing is well aware that its unique ability to influence the DPRK can enhance its negotiating position in Northeast Asia vis-à-vis other regional actors, and it can also potentially draw South Korea further into its sphere of influence, despite the ROK’s strong alliance with the US.[3] Indeed, a 2006 United States Congressional Research Service report entitled, The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: U.S. Policy Choices, echoed this sentiment, stating that “China holds a large wild card in the security relationship because of its influence with Pyongyang.”[4]

A Juche Year Late and a ₩1,000 Short? | Thus, it’s critical to understand that if North Korea defies China and denies it the ability to exercise its strategic leverage over the DPRK, China loses a key negotiating tool in the region. Pyongyang’s apparent disregard for Beijing before the failed 2012 rocket launch has clearly irked the PRC leadership, which may have already begun debating the future of Sino-North Korean relations.

Lee Myung-bak’s meeting with Hu Jintao during the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit apparently played a role in shifting Beijing’s strategic focus South, since it decided to allow numerous North Korean refugees to quietly leave Beijing soon after the summit ended. Until that time, China had not previously released any North Korean defectors to the South during Lee Myung-bak’s presidency. This break from standard repatriation protocol, as well as China’s pledge to dissuade North Korea’s rocket launch, signaled an increasing deterioration in relations with North Korea. To many South Koreans, these are welcome signs that China’s attitude toward North Korea is changing.

Unless North Korea demonstrates a willingness to promote positive changes in its relationship with China, the PRC might eventually come to the conclusion that the relationship is more of a liability than an asset, especially in light of the negative worldwide reaction to China’s policies on North Korean refugees, the unexpected enhancement of bilateral security ties between South Korea and Japan, and the unfavorable security architecture in Northeast Asia, which currently serves to isolate the PRC-DPRK alliance. Ultimately, if North Korea wants to maintain strong ties with China, the leadership in Pyongyang is going to have to do a lot more than send a few delegations to Beijing when China feels slighted.

DPRK state media reported on 18 May (Friday) that the Supreme People’s Assembly [SPA] Presidium appointed Kim Chun Guk as the country’s new ambassador to Italy.  Kim has served as the director of the DPRK Foreign Ministry’s European Bureau (department) for a number of years.  During the late 1990s and early 2000s Kim managed negotiations with the European Union and participated in the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom in 2000, Spain in January 2001, Germany in March 2001 and Luxembourg, also in March 2001.  It is not clear what nonresident ambassadorships Kim will hold.  His predecessor in Rome, Han Tae Song, was also nonresident ambassador to Malta, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus and San Marino.  KCNA reports:

Kim Chun Guk was appointed as DPRK ambassador to Italy, according to a decree of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly.

Meanwhile, Ho Jong Man has been appointed chairman of Chosen Soren (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan; Chongryon), filling the vacancy left by the February 2012 death of So Man Sul.  KCNA/Kyodo report:

The pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan said Saturday Ho Jong Man, its chief vice chairman, has been chosen as its new chairman.

The move came after So Man Sul, former chairman of the group known as Chongryon, died of heart failure in February. So had been chairman since May 2001.

Filed under: Chongryon, Chosen Soren, diploreps, DPRK Cabinet, DPRK diplomats, DPRK External Relations, DPRK-Italy Relations, DPRK-Japan Relations, DPRK-Japan rels, EU-DPRK Relations, KJI Personal Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, North Korean press, Supreme People's Assembly