northkorea

Routledge is one of those commercially successful academic presses that academics love to hate. On the one hand, they publish a lot and some of it is tailored to those of us working in niche markets, like North Korea (we have published in several Routledge volumes). On the other hand, their pricing policies–as much as [...]

Conducting interviews with refugees from North Korea gave me an insight into the reality of life inside the 'impenetrable kingdom'

To Japanese citizens like me, the people of North Korea, though geographically close, are practically invisible. When I decided to write a novel about North Korea – now called From the Fatherland, With Love – I was faced with the challenge of creating believable portraits based strictly on source materials and the imagination. I was unable to enter the country, but having learned of a community of North Korean defectors in Seoul, I went there to interview nearly 20 individuals.

Rather than asking how they'd gone about escaping the north, I wanted to learn about everyday life in the DPRK – what people ate, what they wore, how they got around, how they approached love and romance, what was most important in their lives and so forth. Sometimes this emphasis on the personal only served to put the refugees on their guard. When I asked them to draw simple maps of their hometowns and villages or floor plans of their former homes, for example, some refused, suspecting me of working for South Korean intelligence.

The fundamental life paradigms of these people were so different to anything I'm familiar with that I found the interviews exhausting. North Korea employs a rigid, institutionalised system of class stratification based on family history, and I was surprised to learn that all the defectors I interviewed had previously belonged to the privileged, or "core", class. It seems that people of the middle ("wavering") and lower ("hostile") classes, due to their inability to access information – to say nothing of adequate nutrition – have neither the will nor the energy to attempt to flee the republic.

Virtually all power in the DPRK rests with the Korean People's Army (KPA); and the Korean Workers' party, which is complexly intertwined with the military, controls all chains of command. Members of the special operations forces and the secret police, who I was told served more or less as the private army of then-leader Kim Jong-il, are stationed everywhere. Training for special forces troops is unimaginably severe.

The confession of one former KPA soldier made a particularly strong impression on me. She had been with an anti-aircraft artillery unit outside Pyongyang, and was 32 years old when I interviewed her. This young woman extracted a photo from her purse, handling it as if it were a priceless treasure, and showed it to me. It was a baby picture. "This was taken on his first birthday," she said. "A year later he died of starvation."

She described in detail how her infant son's condition had deteriorated as food supplies dwindled, and how, when there was simply nothing left to eat, she resorted to feeding him boiled pine-tree bark. She explained how she would carefully strip the bark from a tree, pound it with a rock until it was soft, and then boil it in water repeatedly. The resulting gruel caused the baby's belly to swell grotesquely but did nothing to prolong his life.

After her only child died, she fled the Republic in hopes of sending back food for the remaining members of her family. And she had a dream. "Here in Seoul, I'm studying to be a preschool teacher. I want to return to the north after reunification and open a nursery school there. My baby never had a chance to grow up, so I want to see to it that lots of other children do."

It seems to me highly unlikely that this dream of hers will come to fruition. But the fact remains that we on the outside know very little about life in North Korea. People there exist in a kind of pre-modernity that's difficult for us to fully comprehend. Life in North Korea is hidden from view, cloaked in darkness, and the same can be said for the nation's military strategy and the vision of its leaders. Such is the nature of the "impenetrable kingdom" now brandishing its missiles before the world.

• Translated by Ralph McCarthy

...Tyskland är det land i världen som har bäst inflytande på omvärlden, visar en internationell pejling med mer än 26 000 personer som svarat. I botten ligger Nordkorea, Pakistan och Iran.

At a recent conference hosted by the Seoul-based North Korea Strategy Center (북한전략센터) entitled “North Koreans Contact with Outside Information and Changes in Human Rights Consciousness” (북한 주님들의 외부정보 접촉실태와 인궈의식 변화), a panel of defectors and North Korean specialists spoke on the effects that the increase in flow of outside information is having on North Korean society. All panelists agreed that an increasing number of North Koreans are able to learn more about the world through foreign media sources, including TV shows, dramas, radio broadcasts, and DVDs. They also agreed that the influx of outside information into the country is significant impacting daily life: everything from fashion styles to perceptions of South Korea is changing.

The InterMedia report published last year on the changing media environment in North Korea came to similar conclusions. The report found that the North Korean government no longer maintains a total monopoly over the information available to the population and, as a result, North Koreans’ understanding of the world is changing. Not covered in the report or at the conference though is that the North Korean regime’s propaganda strategy is also changing. Instances of double defections are being slyly used by the regime for propagandistic effect. Brian Gleason, writing from Seoul, tells of “Pyongyang’s Evolving ‘Double Defector’ Propaganda” in Part one of a two part series. – Steven Denney, Managing Editor

Overwhelmed by Guilt: Pyongyang’s Evolving “Double Defector” Propaganda (Part 1)

by Brian Gleason

In the past year, the sharp increase in the number of double defector press conferences is clearly an indication of Pyongyang’s strategy to thwart nefarious outside influences and create a “defector deterrent” via an evolving narrative about the horrible life in the South for a North Korean refugee.

After analyzing the 2012 redefections of Pak Jong-suk on June 28 and Kim Kwang-hyok, his wife and child on November 8, I wrote about North Korea’s strategic shift in attempting to stem the tide of North Korean refugees escaping to South Korea. In addition to Kim Jong-un’s orders to beef up border security and intensify the punishments inflicted on those trying to escape, Pyongyang’s propagandists also began to utilize highly publicized double defections to warn North Koreans that they would merely become part of a North Korean refugee underclass in the South, doing “…humble work, cleaning dirty toilets, washing dishes, serving the elderly—which Southern people never do,” according to Pak Jong-suk’s testimony.

This kind of anti-South propaganda represented a significant shift in Pyongyang’s strategy; in the past, the regime always told its people that the centrally planned North Korean economy was superior to the South Korean economic system, which was actually true (in terms of GNP) until 1976, when the South surpassed the North for good. Pyongyang continued to leverage “friendship prices” and other aid from its Soviet and Chinese allies—as well as its iron grip on people and information flowing into or out of the country—in order to maintain the myth of North Korea’s superiority.

However, since the “North Koreans’ growing access to a range of media and communication technologies is undermining the state’s monopoly on what its citizens see, hear, know and think,” the regime can no longer perpetuate the myth of Northern superiority. Experts like Andrei Lankov have also highlighted Pyongyang’s need for a new line of propaganda, stating, “[T]hanks to Choco Pies, DVDs and large-scale labour migration to China, people don’t buy the old story [that the South is even poorer] and the government does not sell it any more.” Thus, in the Kim Jong-un era, Pyongyang has not only developed new forms of propaganda[1]—like the double defector press conferences—it has also crafted new messages and themes to persuade an increasingly skeptical populace and warn against meddlesome outside influences.

Echoes of the 2012 Redefection Press Conferences | In 2013, several additional redefections have reaffirmed Pyongyang’s commitment to its new strategy. In late January at the People’s Palace, Kim Kwang-ho, Ko Kyung-hee and other redefectors gave testimonials that reinforced some familiar themes emphasized in the 2012 press conferences: Kim Kwang-ho alleged that he and his wife were forcibly taken to the South, while Ko Kyung-hee described South Korean society as deceptive (even Machiavellian) and claimed that due to her status as a North Korean defector, she was unable to find employment. Not long after their regrettable decision to defect to the South, they longed to return to the North and were fortunately welcomed back due to the generosity of the Supreme Leader.[2]

In each press conference, the North not only welcomes back the defectors with open arms (thanks to the generosity of Kim Jong-un), it also provides other North Korean refugees in the South with concrete reassurances of why the North will not punish them. North Korean defectors are portrayed not only as victims of South Korean deception, but also as mere mortals who can understandably make stupid mistakes from time to time. Kim Kwang-ho and Kim Ok-shil merely had a “silly/stupid” (어리석은) idea about becoming rich in the South, which of course ended in utter failure. Similarly, Pak Jong-suk was simply pursuing an ill-fated and “foolish idea to meet with my father in the South and ask him for money.” Thus, according to the North’s sympathetic interpretation, these North Korean defectors weren’t inherently treacherous; they merely had a “ foolish” lapse in judgment that led them to fall into the South’s treacherous trap.[3]

In this context, the regime is not only warning its people against making any similarly foolish or silly decisions, it is also extending an olive branch to other North Korean refugees who may be contemplating a return to North Korea by literally offering them rationalizations for defecting that can subsequently be forgiven by the Supreme Leader.[4] With conspicuous parallels to the biblical story of Adam and Eve, the North Korean defectors have sinned not only because they are mortals, but also because they have been deluded by a nefarious force; ultimately, they can only be forgiven and redeemed if they return to the Supreme Leader to beg for forgiveness.

Divided Families, Guilty Consciences | Just as in the 2012 redefections, the January 2013 press conference also aimed to exploit the guilt and emotional hardships that many North Korean refugees experience by leaving their families and hometowns behind. The guilt is multifaceted, since many North Korean refugees often feel guilty for leaving family and friends behind, enjoying a better standard of living in the South[5] and jeopardizing the safety and status of family members back in North Korea.[6]

Pak Jong-suk’s 2012 testimony is especially relevant here, since although her foolish and selfish decision separated her from her family and destroyed her son’s career, “My son is now able to continue teaching at the college [where he used to work],” and Kim Jong-un has graciously allowed her to live with her son and daughter-in-law in Pyongyang. Building on Pak’s sentiments, Kim Kwang-ho and Kim Ok-shil testified in January 2013 that they were worried about their child’s life, so they decided to go back to North Korea after hearing Pak Jong-suk’s press conference. Ko Kyung-hee said she “longed for my children [that I left behind in the North], and yearned for the embrace of my homeland.” These kinds of statements are obviously intended to exploit the guilt felt by many North Korean refugees, who could conceivably become so overwhelmed by guilt and emotion that they would risk returning to the North.

Tug of War: Pulling the “Chain” Northward  |  In Park Kyung-ae’s detailed, multifaceted analysis of North Korean refugee issues, she highlights the increasing rates of “chain” defections in the 21st century:

Another noteworthy trend is the increase of the so-called “ chain” defection. Unlike in the 1990s, many refugees today stay in touch with their families back home or in China and pave the way for their exit for smugglers or brokers, who charge the refugees for facilitating passage of the family members… .Those who arrived in South Korea as chain refugees accounted for 20% of the total refugee population as of 2004.[7]

Throughout the rest of the Kim Jong-il era, the growing flood of North Korean refugees in the South only served to heighten fears in the North about an increasing number of chain defections. In the Kim Jong-un era, the North has been making concrete efforts to break or reverse these chains, especially by targeting defection brokers, threatening the families of North Korean refugees, and through propaganda in the double defector press conferences. Pak Jong-suk, Ko Kyung-hee, Kim Kwang-ho and Kim Ok-shil were all “pulled” back by considerations and concerns for their family members, which represents a reversal of the southward pull of the chain defections noted above. Ko Jong-nam is a case in point, since she reportedly went back to the Sino–North Korean border to bring her children to South Korea, but may have been captured and turned by a North Korean agent, which subsequently led her to bring her husband out of the South and back to the DPRK. As North Korean agents continue to collect information on defection brokers and North Korean refugees, the tug-of-war over chain defectors is tragically likely to continue.

Further Readings

Brian Gleason, “Double Defectors: Signifiers of Pyongyang’s Strategic Shift,” Sino-NK, December 6, 2012.

Gianluca Spezza, “What Double-Defection Tells us About the Prospects For Korean Unification,” NK News, August 9, 2012.

A top-ranking envoy from North Korea delivered a letter from regime leader Kim Jong Un to China’s President Xi Jinping Friday as part of efforts to clear the air between the two neighbors following months of Pyongyang’s ignoring calls from Beijing to tone down on its threats of war. Tensions have been high on the Korean Peninsula after months of fiery rhetoric by Pyongyang directed against South Korea, Japan and the United States, including threats of an imminent nuclear conflict. North Korean Vice Marshal Choe Ryong Hae handed the communiqué to Xi during an afternoon meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, the official Chinese Xinhua news agency reported, though it did not provide details about the letter’s contents. During the meeting Choe told Xi that North Korea is ready accept China’s proposal that it return to the table for multiparty talks on nuclear disarmament, following a series of rocket launches and a nuclear test it carried out in recent months which drew Beijing’s ire and raised tensions on the Korean peninsula. Xi had stressed that denuclearization and stability on the peninsula are of the utmost importance to the region and called on all parties concerned to “remain calm and with restraint, ease the situation and restart the process of the six-party talks” between the two Koreas, Russia, China, the U.S. and Japan, Xinhua said. “China has a very clear position concerning the issue that all the parties involved should stick to the objective of denuclearization, safeguard the peace and stability on the peninsula, and resolve disputes through dialogue and consultation,” Xi said. Xinhua said that Choe expressed “the sincere wish of [North Korea] to create a peaceful external environment to develop its economy and improve people's livelihood.” He said that the North is ready to work with concerned parties to solve relevant issues through dialogue, including the six-party talks, and willing to adopt “active moves to safeguard peace and stability” on the peninsula. The meeting between Xi and Choe followed nearly a half year of no high-level contacts between China and North Korea, during which Pyongyang angered Beijing by launching a long-range rocket in December and conducting a nuclear test in February—raising tensions with South Korea and the U.S. The North had also snubbed an invitation by Beijing to high-level meetings and angered the Chinese public by detaining a Chinese fishing crew this month. Choe’s three-day visit to Beijing comes ahead of a trip to California by Xi to meet with U.S. President Barack Obama in early June and a trip to Beijing by South Korean President Park Geun-hye late next month. Choe had arrived in Beijing on Wednesday. Tenuous relations China is impoverished North Korea's main diplomatic and economic ally but has shown growing irritation with Pyongyang's war threats, and in March backed tough U.N. sanctions against the hardline communist neighbor for its weapons tests. It also cut off dealings with North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank. It is believed that China agreed to a visit by Choe only after it was decided ahead of time that the envoy would publicly state North Korea’s willingness to return to negotiations. Earlier on Friday, Xinhua quoted top Chinese General Fan Changlong as telling Choe that the threat of nuclear war in the region had “intensified strategic conflicts among involved parties and jeopardized the peace and stability of the peninsula. Choe responded that there was “no guarantee of peace” but that North Korea was “willing to work with all sides to search for a method of solving the problems through dialogue.” On Thursday, Choe told the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s fifth-ranked official Liu Yunshan that the North “is willing to accept the suggestion of the Chinese side and launch dialogue with all relevant parties.”

As the Commission of Inquiry swings into gear, those with an interest in human rights in North Korea are asking the difficult question of how to guarantee it has some meaningful effect. Are there issues on which the outside world could actually engage the regime? The prison camp system is emerging as one focal point. [...]

Chinese news reports that a special envoy from Kim Jong Un had “agreed to accept China's advice” to have “dialogue with relevant parties” didn’t do much to impress seasoned North Korea observers, who noted the lack of any indication that Pyongyang was putting its nuclear program back on the negotiating table.

As the battle to supply around $7 billion worth of advanced fighter jets to South Korea enters its final stage, the European bidder has made a new move to try and land the deal.

South Korea’s supreme prosecutors’ office moved to collect a fine from former President Chun Doo-hwan levied 17 years ago as part of a court ruling against Mr. Chun for stacking up slush funds while in office.

SEOUL – Sino-North Korean relations have entered a “new era,” leading CCP figure Liu Yunshan told North Korean state media following a high-level visit from Kim Jong Un’s ‘special envoy’ Choe Ryong Hae to Beijing this week.

Chinese state media (below video), said Choe indicated that North Korea is prepared to “engage in dialogue with the relevant parties,” but this point was not reported on by the KCNA.

NEW ERA

“A visit to China from a special envoy is of great significance since it takes place as Sino-DPRK relations enter a new era of carrying forward the tradition and future,” the KCNA quoted Liu Yunshan as saying.

“The Chinese side hopes that Sino-DPRK relations, built on friendship and cooperation, will grow stronger in political, economic, cultural and other fields in accordance with this new era,” Liu was reported as saying.

A “new era,” in this context, most likely refers to the new leaderships of Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping said Subin Kim, a defense specialist and NK News analyst.

“Since the two states haven’t met formally since the inauguration of both new leaders, this visit is highly likely to serve as a precursor to a possible visit to Beijing from Kim Jong Un,” Kim said.

DIALOGUE

Choe’s apparent acceptance of dialogue, a point still not reported by North Korean media, was already the source of much speculation in Seoul.

“Kim Jong Un wants Choe, who took the lead during the recent heightened tensions, to visit China and say he is willing to end the ‘crisis’ and accept talks, JoongAng Ilbo editor Kim Young-hee wrote in an editorial on Wednesday evening.

The news, whilst still not confirmed by Pyongyang, has already been welcomed regionally.

“It is a positive development that North Korea halts provocative acts and shows signs of accepting dialogue. We will closely watch this,” Yoshihide Suga, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary told reporters in Tokyo.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Choe was taken to the Beijing Economic and Technological Development District, North Korean state television reported during its Wednesday evening broadcast.

“Choe was accompanied by Liu Jieyi, deputy head of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” an announcer said to a backdrop of still images showing Choe’s visit.

The Chinese have previously taken high-level North Korean officials to Special Economic Zones in an apparent attempt to steer reformist thinking among Pyongyang’s leadership.

Headline image: CCTV

 

 

Pyongyang's special envoy makes concession on nuclear disarmament to ease tensions between communist allies

North Korea has offered to renew nuclear disarmament talks, Chinese state media have reported.

At a meeting on Thursday between vice-marshal Choe Ryong Hae and Liu Yunshan, a senior figure in the Chinese Communist party, North Korea heeded China's wishes after months of rising friction between the allies, according to reports

Pynongyang's special envoy praised China's work on behalf of peace and stability and its "great efforts to return [Korean] peninsular issues to the channel of dialogue and negotiation," China Central Television reported. It quoted Choe as saying North Korea "is willing to accept the suggestion of the Chinese side and launch dialogue with all relevant parties".

The North's official Korean Central News Agency made no mention of the concession and instead quoted Choe as saying Pyongyang was committed to maintaining friendly ties with Beijing.

Choe's fence-mending visit to China is the first high-level, face-to-face contact between the two governments in six months, an unusual gap during which Pyongyang conducted rocket launches and nuclear tests and other sabre-rattling.

The moves angered Beijing, which felt its interests in regional stability were not being taken account of. It showed its displeasure by joining with the US to back UN sanctions and cut off dealings with North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank.

China's North Korea watchers said Chinese leaders would be unlikely to have accepted Choe's visit without a promise from Pyongyang that it was prepared to return to diplomacy as Beijing has sought.

"The relationship is rocky so they will try to mend the relationship," said Cui Yingjiu, a retired professor of Korean at Peking University. "Second, they also want to improve relations with the US and need China to be their intermediary."

CCTV said Liu, the Communist party's fifth-ranked leader, called at the meeting for "practical steps to alleviate the tense situation" and an early return to six-nation Korean denuclearisation talks involving the US, South Korea, Japan and Russia as well as North Korea and China.

Pyongyang sent Choe to Beijing as a special envoy for the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un. As such, North Korea watchers said he was expected to hold talks with the Chinese president, Xi Jinping. His comments on Thursday will most likely be seen by Beijing as setting the correct tone of deference for such a meeting.

Xi was in south-west China's Sichuan province inspecting recovery efforts from last month's earthquake.

Awaiting Xi's return, Choe spent part of Thursday touring an industrial park in southern Beijing, accompanied by a Communist party functionary. The Chinese government has in the past used such tours to try to persuade North Korea to adopt China's model of economic reform accompanied by rigid one-party rule.